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Investment incentives targeted at attracting multinational firms have been extensively 
documented and researched, and empirical evidence has shown them to be influential.  The 
same is not true of exit costs.  Yet, as recent theory suggests, there may be a trade-off between 
entry incentives and costs of exit, for example, due to employment protection.  This paper 
focuses on just that trade-off in the case of US multinationals in 33 host countries.  Our results 
suggest that both entry incentives and firing costs are important and ignoring the latter neglects 
an important dimension in firms’ location decision.  This has implications for Europe as a 
location for FDI, as European labor markets are generally considered relatively inflexible 
compared to, for example, the US.   
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1 Introduction 
It is well known that many h ost country governments around the globe attempt to 
attract multinationals by offering generous investment incentives.  For example, Head (1998) 
reports that the government of Alabama paid the equivalent of $150,000 per employee to 
Mercedes for locating its new plant in the state in 1994.  In Europe, Motorola and Siemens 
were provided with the equivalent of an estimated $17,000 and $50,000 per employee to locate 
in Scotland and the North East of England respectively in the 1990s (Haskel et al., 2002).  
Corporate tax rates are also used actively as a policy tool to attract multinationals.  A 
prominent example among EU countries is the Republic of Ireland which offers a nominal tax 
rate of 10 percent on corporate profits. 
Empirical evidence on whether incentives (grants or tax incentives) attract 
multinationals has been provided in a number of papers.  For example, Hines (1996) and Head 
et al. (1999) look at the impact of tax rates and financial incentives, respectively, on 
multinationals investing in the US.  Hubert and Pain (2002) study how FDI in EU countries 
responds to financial incentives offered by host countries.  Grubert and Mutti (2000) and 
Devereux and Griffith (1998) examine the effects of tax rates on location decisions of US 
companies investing abroad.  These studies generally find that both tax rates and financial 
incentives have an impact on location decisions.
1 
While all this suggests that host countries may be able to attract multinationals through 
offering incentives, the issue of potential exit costs has received far less attention in the 
                                                                   
1 However, Head et al. (1999) in their study of Japanese investment in the US argue that competition between host 
(state) governments to attract FDI may render investment subsidies ineffective as they offset each other.  There is 
also a related theoretical literature analysing the  use of investment incentives, see, inter alia, Haufler and Wooton   2 
literature to-date.  This may be an important issue, however, if multinationals, which are often 
argued to be highly footloose (Flamm, 1984; Görg and Strobl, 2002) care about the potential 
costs they have to incur when leaving a host country.  In particular, costs due to employment 
protection legislation, hiring and firing restrictions, lay-off payments, severance payments, etc. 
may be relevant.
2  This is an important issue in the European context, where employment 
protection is regarded as high leading to relative inflexible labor markets compared to the US 
(see, for example, Bentolilla and Bertola, 1990).   
A recent paper by Haaland and Wooton (2002) examines theoretically both the 
importance of investment incentives and firing costs for multinational firms considering 
greenfield investment.  They build a partial equilibrium model in which a foreign monopolist 
bases its location decision on the net present value of future operations, which is influenced by 
operating profits, government subsidies and exit costs.  The last have a role in this model 
because there is exogenously given industry specific uncertainty that the industry may collapse 
in future.  In the model there is a trade off between subsidies and exit costs.  The latter may 
discourage the location of multinationals, particularly in industries with high risk of failure.
3 
As far as we are aware, the idea of the trade-off between entry and exit costs for the 
location of multinationals has not been put to the data yet.
4  This is the main contribution of 
this paper.  The empirical analysis uses data on outward foreign direct investment (FDI) stocks 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                   
(1999) and Kind et al. (2000).  One of the conclusions is that incentives may lead to competition between host 
country governments which may erode any potential benefits from FDI. 
2 The issue of employment protection legislation has been discussed in the labor economics literature; see, for 
example, Lazear (1990) and Jackman et al. (1996).   
3 Dewit et al. (2003) challenge this view on the importance of exit costs by a llowing for strategic behaviour 
between the foreign entrant and an existing host country firm.  In their model, firing costs do not necessarily deter 
the entry of the foreign firm (depending on the nature of competition).  They do not consider the effect of 
investment incentives, however.  Also, only greenfield investment by MNFs is considered.   
4 As pointed out above, a number of empirical papers look at the significance of investment incentives such as 
grants or taxes for the location of FDI.  Haaland et al. (2003) present an empirical analysis relating FDI to exit 
costs (proxied by the level of labor turnover rates), but do not consider investment incentives.     3 
in manufacturing industries by the US.
5  US outward FDI is related to the effective corporate 
tax rate faced by US multinationals in the host country, and an index of firing costs using 
dynamic panel data techniques.  The tax rate is a proxy for inducements to entry while firing 
costs are a proxy for exit costs.
6  To the best of our knowledge, such a variable has not been 
used in previous empirical studies on the location of FDI.   
Our empirical model is embedded in a theoretical framework based on Dixit’s (1989) 
work on entry and exit under uncertainty.  The model by Haaland and Wooton (2002) relates 
specifically to new greenfield investments by multinationals as, by definition, there is no 
takeover possible due to the MNF being a monopolist.  Also, they do not allow for changes in 
the behaviour of multinationals already located in the host following changes in entry or exit 
costs.  The Dixit framework does not require a specific focus on greenfield investment, but one 
can also think of firms entering by taking over an existing domestic or foreign firm (as long as 
there is a sunk cost of entry), and existing multinationals expanding in the host country via new 
investments, or exiting the host country.  In that sense, the model is more appropriate for our 
data, which cover FDI by new greenfield or acquisitions, as well as investments by parent 
companies in foreign affiliates already located in the host country.
7   
Our estimation results show that firing costs and investment incentives matter for the 
location of US manufacturing FDI.  This is robust to a number of alternative estimation 
specifications.  The finding on the importance of incentives is in line with other recent 
evidence.  The significance of firing costs, however, suggests a further important, yet 
                                                                   
5 The choice of the US is motivated by two factors.  First, the US is by far the largest outward investor in the 
world; see, for example, the recent discussion by Lipsey (2001).  Second, data on US outward investment are 
easily available. 
6 The focus on the tax rate of course leaves aside other firm- or industry-specific incentives that may be offered by 
potential host countries.  This is due to data availability.  Under the assumption that these are complements of tax 
breaks, i.e., are positively correlated, this should not cause a problem in the empirical estimation.     4 
heretofore neglected conclusion: multinationals, in particular in manufacturing industries, do 
not only care about entry costs, but also about ease of exiting the host country.  Here, some 
European countries may be at a disadvantage, given their relatively inflexible labor markets 
which impose high exit costs on multinationals 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows.  Section 2 presents a simple 
theoretical framework to motivate our empirical analysis.  Section 3 presents and describes the 
data.  Section 4 discusses the econometric methodology and results.  Section 5 concludes.   
2 Theoretical framework 
To motivate our empirical analysis below this section sets out a brief simple theoretical 
framework based on Dixit’s (1989) model on investment under uncertainty.
8  Dixit showed that 
the entry and exit decision of a firm under uncertainty can be analysed using an analogy 
borrowed from options pricing theory.  In Dixit’s model, a firm at any given time has an option 
to enter a host if it had not been operating there already, exit the market if it was operating, or 
stay put, wait for another period and then decide.  The level of entry and exit costs play crucial 
roles in a firm’s decision about which option to take.  Specifically, Dixit shows that as the level 
of exit costs increases, firms deciding whether or not to enter are more likely to stay out of the 
market.   
It is worth illustrating in a bit more detail how one arrives at that conclusion.  Assume 
that a foreign firm enters a market by committing a lump sum h which one can think of as the 
sunk cost of entry.  A host country government may try to foster entry by offering investment 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                   
7 Also, the Dixit model does not rely on an exogenously given uncertainty but the uncertainty is explicitly 
modelled.   
8 Campa’s (1993) theoretical framework for his analysis of the impact on FDI of uncertainty about exchange rates 
is also based on Dixit’s model.  This type of frame work is also used in the recent literature on sunk costs and 
exporting, see, for example, Roberts and Tybout (1997), Clerides et al. (1998) and Bernard and Jensen (2004).    5 
incentives g which are aimed at reducing the sunk cost of entry.  Hence, net entry costs equal s 
= h – g > 0.
9  While producing, a firm faces variable cost c.  Upon exit, there is a cost k which 
one can think of as severance payments, compliance with firing restrictions, etc.  After exiting, 
a firm would have to incur s again if it decided to re-enter at a later stage.  A firm maximises 
its expected net present value given a depreciation rate of d.  There is uncertainty in the firm’s 
decision due to fluctuations of the market price P which follows some stochastic process.
10   
One can interpret as a firm exercising an option to invest, the option price being equal 
to the sunk cost of investment s.  Similarly, exit is an option to divest with option price k.  In 
this scenario, there are two decision variables Pen and Pex.  If the market price P rises above Pen 
it is beneficial for the firm to exercise the option and enter, while a firm should exit if P falls 
below Pex.  At any given time the firm can be in two possible states, either active in the host 
country (1) or not (0).   
In the latter state, the firm decides whether to remain inactive or enter; it will do so if 
Pen satisfies the value matching condition
11 
V0(Pen) = V1(Pen) – s      (1) 
where V0(P) is the net present value of starting with P in the inactive state and 
following optimal policies, and similarly for V1(P) in the active state.  That is, the firm would 
enter if the present value from entering minus the cost of entry is at least equal to the present 
value from staying out.
12   
                                                                   
9 For example, the UK and Ireland offer investment subsidies which are paid as a percentage of capital investment 
at entry or as a percentage of employment.  The latter may at least be partly sunk costs if one views labor as a 
quasi-fixed factor as in Oi (1962).  Also, tax incentives may be thought of as being aimed at reducing sunk capital 
costs.   
10 Dixit (1989) assumes it follows a Brownian motion but also shows that other types of fluctuations, e.g., mean 
reverting process produce similar results.   
11 Strictly speaking, Pen must also satisfy a smooth pasting condition, see Dixit (1989, p. 627).   
12 In that case, the return to the firm is the expected capital gain accruing on the asset held for future investment.     6 
If the firm is already active in the host country it decides whether to stay or exit.  This, 
in turn, depends on the present value from staying compared to the present value from exiting 
minus the exit cost, 
V1(Pex) = V0(Pex) – k      (2) 
V1(P) is shown to depend negatively on the level of variable production costs and 
uncertainty about the output price.   
Totally differentiating the explicit functional forms of the above two equations, one can 
show that as s or k increase, Pex decreases and Pen increases.  Hence, increases in exit cost or 
reductions in investment incentives (for constant levels of sunk entry cost) widen the band of 
inaction, where firms find it neither optimal to enter if they are inactive, or exit if they are 
active.  
From this we can derive the hypothesis that reductions in investment incentives (i.e., 
lower grants or higher taxes) which increase sunk entry costs and/or increases in exit costs may 
be expected to reduce the level of foreign direct investment in a host country.  This is due to 
lower entry of new foreign affiliates, since the threshold price for entry increases, and the lack 
of new investment by foreign firms already located in the host country, as they find it optimal 
to remain as they are.  In the following sections we set out to test this hypothesis empirically.   
3 Description of the data 
In order to check whether there is empirical support for the above hypothesis, we relate 
US outward FDI stocks to the level of investment incentives and exit costs in a number of host 
countries.
13  The theoretical model does not distinguish between greenfield or acquisition FDI, 
or new investments by parent companies in foreign affiliates already located in the host and,   7 
hence, the FDI measure appears appropriate for our analysis.  It could be argued that one 
should analyse firm or plant level data on multinationals’ entry and exit decisions and relate 
these to corresponding micro data on tax payments, subsidies and exit costs.  However, such 
data are not available.  Moreover, since firing costs and taxation are usually constant (or very 
similar) across industries and firms, as they are set by national legislation, the use of country 
level data is appropriate.  
Our empirical analysis uses data on the stock of outward foreign direct investment in 
manufacturing industries by US multinational firms in 33 host countries, including a number of 
European countries.  A list of host countries is given in Table 1.  The US FDI data are available 
from the 1970s onwards from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) at the US Department 
of Commerce.
14  
The level of US FDI stocks is related to measures of profit taxation (as a proxy for 
investment incentives) and exit costs affecting multinationals.  Taxation is measured using data 
for effective tax rates for US multinationals available from Grubert and Mutti (2000).  They 
use US corporate income tax returns to calculate “[a]verage host country corporate tax rates 
[…] by taking total income taxes paid by manufacturing CFCs [controlled foreign corporation] 
incorporated in that country divided by their total earnings and profits” (Grubert and Mutti, 
2000, p. 830).
15  The data published in Grubert and Mutti (2000) are for 1984, 1986, 1990 and 
1992.  John Mutti generously made data available for 1988, 1994 and 1996 also.   
                                                                                                                                                                                                                   
13 As pointed out above, only taxes are considered as investment incentives, mainly due to data constraints.   
14 Nominal values are deflated and expressed in 1995 US$ using a GDP deflator.   
15 An obvious question is whether the average tax rate is, indeed, the relevant measure for taxation.  Arguably, the 
average tax rate is appropriate for the decision of whether to enter a country, while for expansions of existing 
operations in the host country, the marginal tax rate may be more relevant.  Unfortunately, we do not have data 
available on the marginal tax rate and hence follow the related literature, such as Grubert and Mutti (2000) and 
Hubert and Pain (2001) by using a measure of the average tax rate.     8 
Exit costs are difficult to measure as they include a variety of components.  We proxy 
exit costs via a country level index on the magnitude of hiring and firing costs in each country.  
The index itself, which does not appear to have been used in the literature thus far, is 
constructed from extensive surveys of managers in 47 countries conducted by the  World 
Economic Forum.  In 1999, the World Competitiveness Yearbook reports that 4,160 managers 
participated.  In the survey, participants are asked to give a score between 0 and 1 in response 
to a number of questions describing the overall business climate and competitiveness of the 
country in which the firm operates.  The particular question for the index used here is: “Hiring 
and firing practices are too restricted by government or are flexible enough”.  The higher the 
index the more business friendly respondents judge these practices.  The index is available to 
us from 1986 to 1996.   
Combining the data from these different data sources yields a country panel dataset for 
US outward FDI for the years 1986, 1988, 1990, 1992, 1994 and 1996.   
Table 1 reports summary statistics on average levels of taxation and exit cost indices to 
provide an overview of the variation in the two variables across host countries.  It is clear that 
the US, as the home country, has one of the most liberal hiring and firing regimes, surpassed 
only by Hong Kong and Singapore.  By contrast, EU countries, with the exception of the UK, 
score fairly low on this index; all of them have indices well below the overall sample mean.  
India appears to have the highest level of exit costs in the sample.  The average effective rate of 
taxation is also fairly high among EU countries, although there is the obvious exception of 
Ireland.  Japan is the country with the highest rate of taxation, however.   
[Table 1 here]   9 
As the figures reported in Table 2 show, most countries increased their firing cost index 
(i.e., liberalised firing practices) and reduced their effective rate of taxation between 1986 and 
1996.  The most striking example is New Zealand, which increased its firing index by 45 
decimal points (equivalent to a 169 percent increase), and experienced a decrease in its 
effective tax rate by 33 decimal points (or 76 percent).  However, there are also countries 
which seem to have reduced the flexibility of firing practices, such as India, Korea and, most 
notably from a European perspective, Italy.  Furthermore, a number of countries increased their 
effective tax rate – for example, Singapore by 2 percentage points (equivalent to a 110 percent 
increase) between 1986 and 1996.  Ireland experienced an even higher increase in both 
absolute and percentage terms.  However, in both cases, these represent increases from very 
low bases.   
[Table 2 here] 
4 Econometric analysis and results 
In line with related literature (e.g., Keller and Levinson, 2002 and Wei, 2000), the core 
empirical equation to be estimated is 
it i t it it it it it X FDI FDI e m u l k l t l l + + + + + + = - 3 2 1 1 0   (3) 
where FDI is the log of US FDI stocks (in 1995 US $) in host country i at time t and t-
1, respectively.  The lagged dependent variable is included to pick up intertemporal correlation 
in FDI due to, for example, agglomeration effects that may attract MNFs to a particular 
location (see, e.g., Wheeler and Mody, 1992, Barrell and Pain, 1999).  The variable t is the log 
effective average tax rate, k is the log firing cost index and u is a full set of time dummies.  
Given that the data form essentially a short country panel the empirical estimation allows for   10 
the presence of a time-invariant country specific effect m.
16  The remaining error term  e is 
assumed to be white-noise.   
The vector X includes a number of other host country variables which can be expected 
to impact on FDI.  These include the log of GDP and log GDP per capita, to control for 
differences in market size and purchasing power, although the latter variable may also be 
thought of as being a proxy for average labor cost in a model with labor being the only factor 
of production.  The two GDP variables are in constant 1995 US $ taken from the World Bank’s 
World Development Indicators.  Also, to be sure that the coefficients on t and k do not merely 
pick up correlations with other costs of investment in the host country we include a proxy for 
investment costs in  X.  These are calculated as a simple average of several indices of 
impediments to investment, also taken from the World Economic Forum.
17 
First differencing equation (3) allows us to purge the unobserved firm specific effect m.  
However, due to the inclusion of the lagged dependent variable, performing OLS on the first 
differenced version of (3) will render biased and inconsistent estimates; see Baltagi (2001).  To 
avoid this equation (3) is estimated with the linear generalised methods of moments (GMM) 
estimator as proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991).  This estimator uses appropriate lagged 
levels of the dependent variable and of independent variables as instruments for the equation in 
first differences. 
Equation (3) is estimated pooling the bi-annual data for 1986 to 1996 for all host 
countries.  When applying the GMM estimator one has the choice of using both a one step and 
a two step procedure to arrive at estimates of the model in question.  Arellano and Bond (1991) 
                                                                   
16 Taking account of this country specific time invariant effect means that no other country specific time invariant 
variables, such as distance, language dummy, regional dummy etc are included in the model. 
17 See the appendix for a description of that index.  A similar, though not identical, measure was used by Amiti 
and Wakelin (2003).     11 
show that the asymptotic standard errors from two step estimations may be a poor guide for 
hypothesis testing.  However, the two step estimations are preferred for inference on model 
specification, specifically, the Sargan test for instrument validity and the test for second-order 
autocorrelation.
18  Hence, we present coefficients and standard errors from the one step 
estimations, while the Sargan and AR(2) tests are calculated based on the two step estimates.   
Estimation results are presented in Table 3.  Note that the lagged dependent variable is 
statistically significant and positive in both specifications, indicating that the dynamic 
specification is appropriate.  Column (1) shows results for a specification of equation (3) 
excluding the investment cost variable, while column (2) includes this.  The robust coefficients 
on the exit cost index and the tax rate in both specifications indicate that these variables do not 
pick up effects associated with the general cost of investing in the host country, which is 
controlled for in column (2).
19 
Turning our attention to the coefficients on exit costs and taxation, it is clear from 
columns (1) and (2) that both are important and have the anticipated effects.  The results in 
column (2) show that an increase in the exit cost index (i.e., a lowering of firing cost 
restrictions) by one percent raises FDI by 0.39 percent.  Similarly, a reduction in the tax rate by 
1 percent increases FDI by 0.23 percent.   
Taking these point estimates at face value we can conduct simple thought experiments 
asking questions like: if a country wants to increase its tax rate but maintain its current level of 
FDI, by how much would it have to increase its exit cost index?  In the example of column (2) 
if a country were to increase its tax rate by 5 percent it would have to achieve an increase in its 
                                                                   
18 Note that the consistency of the estimates rests on the assumption that there is no second order correlation of the 
residuals of the first-differenced equation (Arellano and Bond, 1991). 
19 Note that the pair-wise correlation coefficients for the firing cost index and tax rate with the investment cost 
index are –0.07 and 0.04, respectively and are not statistically significant in either case.     12 
exit cost index by 2.9 percent to maintain its value of inward US FDI stocks, all other things 
being equal.  More specifically, if a country with a low tax rate but relatively high exit cost 
index, for example Ireland, were able to increase its exit cost index to the level of the US (i.e., 
by 45 percent from 0.490 to 0.708) it could afford to increase its effective rate of taxation by 
77percent and keep its level of US FDI stocks constant.
20   
[Table 3 here] 
The basic specification estimated in Table 3 constrains the effect of investment 
incentives and exit costs to be equal across countries.  This might be a stringent assumption.  In 
particular, from the theoretical framework one may expect differences in the effects of these 
two variables on FDI across countries with high as opposed to low levels of uncertainty, given 
that uncertainty is a crucial influence on a firm’s decision of whether or not to exercise its 
option.  In order to take account of this, we first assume that degrees of uncertainty are 
different between developed and developing countries, with the latter being more risky at least 
for manufacturing activities due to economic and political instability. 
Hence, we calculate a developing country dummy = 1 if the host country is a developing 
country, defined as a low or middle income country according to the World Bank 
classification.  This dummy is then interacted with the exit cost and investment cost indices 
and the tax variable in order to allow the coefficients on these variables to differ for the two 
groups of countries.  Our results are reported in columns (1) and (2) of Table 4.  The results 
still show a strong positive effect of the exit cost index for developed and developing countries 
and a negative, though statistically insignificant, coefficient on the tax rate, but no differential 
effect across the two groups of countries for any of the variables.  
                                                                   
20 0.389*((0.708-0.490)/0.490)/0.227   13 
To investigate further potential differences in uncertainty across groups of countries, 
we include an index of economic risk in the regression.  This variable is included to proxy for 
country specific risks like possible expropriation of assets, insecurity of property rights and 
contracts, and so on.  The data for this variable are taken also from the World Economic Forum 
and range from 0 to 1 with higher values indicating lower risk.  Based on this index we 
calculate a dummy variable for risky countries equal to 1 if the economic risk index is below 
the median value (0.375) in the sample and zero otherwise.  This dummy is interacted with the 
exit cost index, tax rate and the investment cost variable.   
Our results are presented in columns (3) and (4) of Table 4.  The strong result on the 
exit cost index remains robust, indicating that countries with more liberal firing restrictions are 
able to attract more FDI.  We do not find statistically significant evidence that this coefficient 
varies with country specific risk.  The coefficient on the tax rate is also still statistically 
significant and negative, as expected.  However, the associated interaction term now suggests 
that the effect of the tax rate is less for countries with high (relative to the sample median) 
levels of perceived economic risk.  This suggests that the tax rate is not an important deterrent 
for FDI in countries with relatively high levels of economic risk.   
[Table 4 here] 
5 Conclusions 
This paper investigates the trade off between investment incentives and exit costs for 
the location of foreign direct investment (FDI).  While some recent theoretical work has 
focused on this, there does not appear to have been any empirical work in this area.  This paper 
attempts to fill that gap.  Our analysis considers the effect of profit taxation (as a measure of 
investment incentives) and an index of hiring and firing costs (proxying exit costs) on the   14 
location of US outward FDI in 33 host countries for the period 1986 to 1996.  Given that the 
data are on FDI stocks a dynamic model of the determinants of FDI is estimated using a 
generalised methods of moments (GMM) estimation technique.   
The empirical results are as follows.  US FDI is positively affected by investment 
incentives and low levels of firing costs.  These results are robust to a number of different 
empirical specifications.  In particular, they do not change following the inclusion of other 
measures of investment costs in the host country, and allowing for different coefficients for 
developed and developing countries, or countries with relatively high and low levels of 
perceived economic risk.  
Our results point to an important, yet heretofore neglected conclusion.  If countries 
want to attract FDI, in particular in manufacturing, providing incentives may not be enough; 
exit costs also need to be at a level attractive to MNFs.  This includes, for example, such 
factors as redundancy payments and ease of firing of workers.  Of course, these are exactly the 
issues currently being debated in the context of potential reform of European labor markets.  
FDI may provide another angle from which to look at the issue of reforming labor markets in 
order to remain competitive as a location for international production.     15 
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Appendix: Description of the investment cost index  
 
The index is a simple average of indices on the following scores: 
 
1.  Foreign investor control: “Foreign investors may not acquire control in a domestic company or are free to 
acquire control in a domestic company” 
 
2.  Immigration laws: “Immigration laws prevent your company from employing foreign skills or do not prevent 
your company from employing foreign skills” 
 
3.  Cross-border ventures: “Cross border ventures cannot be negotiated with foreign partners without government 
imposed restraint or can be negotiated freely” 
 
4.  Anti-trust laws: “Anti trust laws do not prevent unfair competition in your country or do prevent unfair 
competition in your country” 
 
5.  Justice: “There is no confidence in the fair administration of justice in the society or there is full confidence in 
the fair administration of justice in society” 
 
6.  State control: “State control of enterprise distorts fair competition in your country or does not distort fair 
competition in your country” 
 
7.  Local capital markets: “Local capital markets are not accessible to foreign companies or are equally 
accessible to domestic and foreign companies” 
 
8.  Foreign capital markets: “Access to foreign capital markets is restricted for domestic companies or is not 
restricted for domestic companies” 
 
9.  Intellectual property rights: “Intellectual property rights are inadequately protected in your country or is 
adequately protected in your country” 
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Table 1: Mean values of firing cost index and effective tax rate by country (1986-1996) 
 
  Firing cost index  Effective tax rate 
Country  mean  std.dev.  mean  std.dev. 
AUSTRALIA  0.473  0.136  0.323  0.044 
AUSTRIA  0.460  0.068  0.353  0.188 
BLEU  0.411  0.036  0.268  0.061 
BRAZIL  0.620  0.075  0.209  0.088 
CANADA  0.606  0.043  0.328  0.041 
CHILE*  0.673  0.007  0.097  0.027 
COLOMBIA
*  0.550  0.020  0.288  0.040 
FINLAND  0.475  0.025  0.231  0.087 
FRANCE  0.415  0.083  0.292  0.078 
GERMANY  0.425  0.042  0.320  0.090 
GREECE  0.377  0.072  0.282  0.045 
HONG KONG  0.830  0.058  0.107  0.021 
INDIA  0.279  0.062  0.362  0.056 
INDONESIA
#  0.508  0.088  0.309  0.035 
IRELAND  0.490  0.074  0.053  0.026 
ITALY  0.322  0.069  0.334  0.035 
JAPAN  0.560  0.028  0.499  0.047 
KOREA  0.508  0.076  0.307  0.085 
MALAYSIA  0.624  0.053  0.123  0.075 
MEXICO  0.505  0.031  0.266  0.068 
NETHERLANDS  0.381  0.046  0.236  0.069 
NEW ZEALAND  0.575  0.254  0.255  0.135 
NORWAY  0.463  0.054  0.228  0.086 
PORTUG AL   0.346  0.049  0.265  0.015 
SINGAPORE  0.758  0.088  0.048  0.013 
SOUTH AFRICA
+  0.624  0.092  0.358  0.084 
SPAIN  0.307  0.039  0.236  0.035 
SWEDEN  0.414  0.053  0.287  0.195 
SWITZERLAND  0.698  0.098  0.135  0.032 
THAILAND  0.693  0.046  0.230  0.068 
TURKEY  0.598  0.122  0.373  0.085 
UK  0.673  0.108  0.254  0.063 
VENEZUELA
+  0.465  0.056  0.226  0.090 
US  0.708  0.034     
OVERALL MEAN  0.510  0.155  0.248  0.123 
 
Notes: The table reports simple unweighted means 
Means and std.devs. for firing cost index relate to * 1994-1996; + 1992-1996; # 1988-1996   19 
 
Table 2: Changes in firing cost index and effective tax rate between 1986 and 1996 by country 
 
  Firing cost index  Effective tax rate 
Country  percentage  absolute  percentage  absolute 
AUSTRALIA  0.760  0.200  -0.161  -0.060 
AUSTRIA  0.158  0.063  0.303  0.071 
BLEU  -0.099  -0.039  -0.435  -0.165 
BRAZIL  0.314  0.166  -0.531  -0.154 
CANADA  0.105  0.058  -0.230  -0.088 
CHILE*  -0.017  -0.012  0.012  0.001 
COLOMBIA
*  0.052  0.028  -0.332  -0.117 
FINLAND  -0.028  -0.013  -0.475  -0.169 
FRANCE  0.499  0.136  -0.423  -0.167 
GERMANY  0.095  0.036  -0.376  -0.180 
GREECE  0.554  0.154  0.455  0.102 
HONG KONG  0.166  0.127  0.219  0.021 
INDIA  -0.429  -0.150  -0.268  -0.108 
INDONESIA
#  0.633  0.229  -0.151  -0.053 
IRELAND  0.436  0.157  1.266  0.043 
ITALY  -0.174  -0.059  -0.017  -0.006 
JAPAN  0.087  0.047  -0.100  -0.050 
KOREA  -0.134  -0.079  -0.233  -0.063 
MALAYSIA  0.054  0.031  -0.748  -0.200 
MEXICO  -0.038  -0.021  -0.487  -0.147 
NETHERLANDS  0.037  0.013  -0.523  -0.177 
NEW ZEALAND  1.693  0.445  -0.758  -0.332 
NORWAY  0.175  0.070  -0.523  -0.189 
PORTUGAL   0.496  0.134  0.132  0.032 
SINGAPORE  0.305  0.198  1.109  0.028 
SOUTH AFRICA
+  -0.242  -0.166  -0.219  -0.063 
SPAIN  0.014  0.004  -0.252  -0.070 
SWEDEN  0.129  0.044  -0.771  -0.428 
SWITZERLAND  0.304  0.182  -0.321  -0.059 
THAILAND  0.094  0.059  -0.185  -0.052 
TURKEY  0.397  0.203  0.016  0.007 
UK  0.490  0.240  -0.339  -0.126 
VENEZUELA
+  -0.177  -0.094  -0.541  -0.162 
US  -0.041  -0.028     
OVERALL MEAN  0.142  0.065  -0.288  -0.086 
 
Notes: The table reports simple unweighted means 
Growth rates for firing cost index relate to * 1994-1996; + 1992-1996; # 1988-1996 
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Table 3: Regression results for dynamic panel data regression 
 
  (1)  (2) 
lagged FDI stock  0.758  0.697 
  (0.144)***  (0.206)*** 
exit cost index   0.350  0.389 
  (0.184)*  (0.225)* 
effective tax rate  -0.179  -0.227 
  (0.106)*  (0.123)* 
investment cost index     -0.337 
    (0.383) 
GDP  0.503  2.538 
  (0.336)  (1.510)* 
GDP per capita  0.257  -1.387 
  (0.374)  (1.696) 
Constant  -0.018  -0.097 
  (0.035)  (0.054)* 
Sargan test (p-value)  0.08  0.25 
AC(2) (p-value)  0.35  0.60 
Observations  144  95 
 
Notes:  
Standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Coefficients are from one-step estimates, Sargan and AC(2) tests are from two step estimations   21 
 
Table 4: Regression results including interaction terms  
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
  fdiman  Fdiman  Fdiman  fdiman 
lagged FDI stock  0.814  0.761  0.763  0.787 
  (0.156)***  (0.222)***  (0.138)***  (0.208)*** 
exit cost index   0.533  0.532  0.543  0.497 
  (0.217)**  (0.239)**  (0.200)***  (0.250)** 
exit cost index * 
interaction 
-0.512  -0.474  -0.171  -0.057 
  (0.425)  (0.536)  (0.197)  (0.239) 
effective tax rate  -0.155  -0.210  -0.226  -0.362 
  (0.137)  (0.149)  (0.105)**  (0.134)*** 
effective tax rate * 
interaction 
-0.078  -0.077  0.305  0.753 
  (0.222)  (0.267)  (0.103)***  (0.247)*** 
investment cost index    -0.435    0.148 
    (0.441)    (0.414) 
investment cost index 
* interaction 
  0.205    -0.755 
    (0.663)    (0.364)** 
GDP  0.471  2.388  0.432  3.308 
  (0.348)  (1.806)  (0.328)  (1.482)** 
GDP per capita  0.272  -1.074  0.217  -2.428 
  (0.385)  (1.891)  (0.363)  (1.668) 
Constant  -0.030  -0.115  0.305  -0.102 
  (0.037)  (0.059)*  (0.103)***  (0.055)* 
Sargan test (p-value)  0.10  0.19  0.10  0.57 
AC(2) (p-value)  0.40  0.65  0.13  0.96 
Observations  144  95  144  95 
 
Notes:  
Standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Coefficients are from one-step estimates, Sargan and AC(2) tests are from two step estimations 
Interaction terms in columns (1) and (2) are with developing country dummy, in columns (3) and (4) with 
economic risk dummy 
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